THE "BASTARD" IN THE CONFLICT OF
LAWS-A NATIONAL DISGRACE
ALBERT A.

EHRENZWEIG t

NUNWED mother brings suit in New York, the state of her domicile, to

establish the defendant's paternity and to obtain support for her
child.1 The defendant, a Chicago attorney, claims that he is "forever"
protected against such a suit by an agreement which he concluded with the
mother after the child's birth. Having given her $2,000, he undertook to pay
$275 a month for the support of the child for 16 years on the understanding
that such payments would not "constitute an admission" of paternity, and
that he would henceforth be released "from all manner of actions ... "2
Under New York law such an agreement would, in the absence of court
approval, have been ineffective regarding the child's support and, probably,
even with such approval as to a subsequent suit to establish paternity. 3
Nevertheless, the New York Court of Appeals upheld the agreement under
the law of Illinois and dismissed the suit. That law, which then did not require
court approval for settlements exceeding $800,4 was held applicable as agreed
upon by the parties and under the "more modern view" of conflicts law which
lays emphasis on "'the most significant contacts with the matter in dispute.' "5 Such contacts were found concentrated in Illinois because the agreement had (incorrectly) designated that state as that of the parties' residence,
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1Suit was brought under N.Y.C.

CRIM. CTS. AcT § 64 "to establish the paternity of the
child and to compel support." Haag v. Barnes, 11 App. Div. 2d 430, 207 N.Y.S.2d 624, 626
(1960), aff'd, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65, 175 N.E.2d 441 (1961).
2 Haag v. Barnes, supranote 1, at 557-58, 216 N.Y.S.2d at 67, 175 N.E.2d at 442.
3 N.Y.C. CRiM. CTs. Act § 63 (3) provides that "complete performance of the agreement ....when so approved, shall bar other remedies of the mother or child for support."
(Emphasis added.) See also N.Y. DOM. REL. CT. AcT § 121 (3); Bancroft v. Court of Spe-

cial Sessions, 278 App. Div. 141, 103 N.Y.S.2d 779 (1951), aff'd, 303 N.Y. 728, 103 N.E.2d
344 (1951). Rhyne v. Katleman, 206 Misc. 202, 133 N.Y.S.2d 221 (1954), aff'd, 285 App.

Div. 1140, 142 N.Y.S. 2d 365 (1955), giving effect to a Nevada compromise, did not involve
a denial of admission of paternity.
4

The entire "Bastardy" chapter of the Illinois Statutes was repealed shortly after the

agreement in Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65, 175 N.E.2d 441 (1961). ILL.
ANN. STAT. ch. 106 3/4, § 65 (Smith-Hurd, Supp. 1961), would not permit, and, contrary
to the view of the Haag court, has apparently retroactively invalidated this agreement. Cf.
Feirich, PaternityAct of 1957, Blessing or Blight? 47 ILL. B.J. 824, 832 (1959), deploring
the demise of the paternity settlement.
5Haag

v. Barnes, supra note 4, at 559, 216 N.Y.S.2d 68-69, 175 N.E.2d at 443.
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and because illinois was the state of the defenidant's place of business (hardly
a meaningful "contact"), of the child's birth (required by the defendant to
occur in Chicago), of the residence of the parties' agents and attorneys (?),
and of the place of payment (subject to arbitrary selection). The facts "that
child and mother presently live in New York and that part of the 'liaison'
took place in New York," as well as the fact that the mother apparently had
also previously been resident and employed in New York,6 were held "of far
7
less weight and significance."
This conclusion illustrates the unavoidable arbitrariness of the "modern"
test based on the "most significant relationship," now so unhappily ensconced
in the (Draft) Second Restatement of the law of Conflict of Laws. 8 Clearly
under this test the court, at least as easily, could have decided for the plaintiff
by finding the New York contacts to have been "most significant." By nevertheless choosing a law unfavorable to the plaintiff, this decision of one of our
most distinguished courts, though perhaps at least partially justifiable on its
particular facts, 9 has exposed dramatically that ignominious anachronism in
American law which continues to deprive the "bastard" of the dignity and
comfort of being a father's child.10
The Church has always recognized the blood relationship of illegitimate
parents. Although secular law has been thus humanized only in this century,
in many foreign countries the problem is approaching its final solution, namely the complete equation of illegitimate birth to birth in lawful wedlock." At
6 See Haag v. Barnes, 11 App. Div.2d 430, 207 N.Y.S.2d 624 (1960) (dissent).
7 Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 560, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65, 69, 175 N.E.2d 441,444 (1961).
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 (1960). See EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT

OF LAws § 174 (4) (forthcoming ed. 1962); Cavers, Re-restating the Conflict of Laws: The
Chapteron Contracts,in XXTH CENTURY COMPARATIVE AND CONFLICTS LAW 349-64 (1961);

Leflar, Conflict of Laws, Contracts, andthe New Restatement, 15 ARK. L. REv. 163 (1961);
Weintraub, The Contracts Proposals of the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws-A
Critique,46 IowA L. REv. 713 (1961).
9 The court stressed the fact that the defendant had "provided sums far in excess of his
agreement." Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y. 2d 554, 558, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65, 67, 175 N.E.2d 441,443

(1961).
10 2 ARMSTRONG, CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAW 908, 949 (1953); FREUND, ILLEGITIMACY
LAws OF THE UNTRD STATES (1919); HARPER, PROBLEMS OF THE FAMILY 119-34 (1952);
Robbins and Dedik, The FamilialProperty Rights of Illegitimate Children: A Comparative

Study, 30 COLUM. L. REv. 308 (1930); Wysong, The Jurisprudenceof Labels-Bastardyas a
Case in Point, 39 NEB. L. REv. 648 (1960); Notes, I AM. J. COmp. L. 124-28 (1952); 38
B.U.L. REv. 299 (1958); 15 LA. L. REV. 221 (1954). Most of the conflicts literature deals
with problems of legitimacy and legitimation rather than the treatment of illegitimate
children. See, e.g., Ester, Illegitimate Childrenand Conflict ofLaws, 36 IND. L. J. 163 (1961);

Guttman, Whither Legitimacy: An Investigation of the Choice of Law Rules to Determine
the Status of Legitimacy, 14 RUTGERS L. REv. 764 (1960); Note, 57 COLum. L. REv. 580
(1957).
11 See Arnholm, The New Norwegian Legislation Relating to Parents and Children, 3
SCAND. STUDIES IN LAW 9, 18 (1959); KEGEL, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 295-305
(1960); NEUHAUS, DIE VERPFLICHTUNGEN DES UNEHELICHEN VATERS IM DEUTSCHEN INTERNATIONALEN PRIVATRECHT 36 (1953); MfUler-Freienfels, Zur koisionsrechtlichenBehandlung
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least three of the United States and Puerto Rico have followed this lead.12 And
statutes of many other states have given the "bastard" rights to support and
inheritance. But in the absence of popular awareness of the problem and continuing emphasis on the penal character of paternity proceedings legislative
progress is likely to be slow.13
Over 220,000 illegitimate children were born in the United States in 1959.
One out of twenty Americans is born as a "bastard."1 4 Although many and
perhaps most of them later acquire full citizenship by adoption or legitimation, there are those, and they probably still count millions, who will never
have a father; many of them because the mother was permitted by the law
to bartef away the paternity suit. In other countries every illegitimate child on
his birth becomes the ward of the state which, through a special agency ex
officio, will take every step to ascertain the father whether or not there is hope
of his being able to furnish support.s We have no such institution. Yet, in
1960, a leading magazine with world-wide circulation found the only "scandal
of our paternity suits" in undue hardships caused to alleged illegitimate
fathers.16
An unknown number of such fathers escape paternity suits by leaving the
state where mother and child reside. That we have only a handful of cases
dealing with the resulting conflicts situations, is no doubt largely explainable
by the mothers' lack of funds and initiative. Pressure of public opinion will
have to compel nationwide reform. The present paper is limited to such
minor improvements as have been achieved by progressive courts in cases
involving choice of law or jurisdiction in suits for the declaration of paternity
and for support.
der Abstammungsklage, 4 ZEIT. FOR.DAS GESAMTE FAMILIENRECHT 147 (1957); Pfenniger,
Die Vaterschaftsklageim internationalenPrivatrecht,53 ScHwEizERiscHE JURiSTFEN-ZEITUNG
319 (1957); Pallard, La filiation illjgitime en droit internationalprivi franrais,41 REVUE
CRITIQUE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL PRIVE 623 (1952). In this field communist countries can
justly claim more consistent progress. See RICZEI, INTERNATIONALES PRIVATRECHT 373-75
(1960); Schmied, Das Familienrechtder Volksdemokratien 1945-1951, 17 ZErr. FOR AusLANDISCHES UND INT. PRIVATRECHT 227, 239-42 (1952); Cigoj, Die Gleichstellung der ehelichen und unehelichen Kinder im jugoslawischen Recht, 23 ZEIT. FOR AusLXNDIscmES UND INT.
PRIvATRECHT 139 (1958).
12 ARIZ.REV. STAT. ANN.§ 14-206 (1956); N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-0105 (1960) (inheritance only); ORE. REV. STAT. § 109.060 (1959); P.R. LAws ANN.tit. 31 § 441 (1955) See. e.g.,
Hazelett v. State, 55 Ariz. 141, 99 P.2d 101 (1940); Di Medio v. Port Norris Express Co.,
176 A.2d 550 (N J. Super. 1961).
13 See, e.g., Comment, Support of Children Born out of Wedlock: Virginia at the Crossroads, 18 WAsH. & LEE L. REV. 343 (1961). For a statutory survey, see Note, 26 BROOKLYN
L. REV. 45, 76-79 (1960).
14WORLD ALMANAC 300-01. (77th ed. 1962). At least 14 states do not state legitimacy in
their birth records. I. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE ANN.REP. 14
(1958 ed. 1960). All figures are therefore based on estimates.
15 See e.g., GEN. CIVIL CODE § 208 (Austria 1914).
16 Schatkin, The Scandal of our Paternity Courts,Reader's Digest, May 1960, p. 72.
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A. PATERNITY SUITS
1. Jurisdiction

In the civil law world, the law's solicitude for the alleged illegitimate father
suffered a decisive blow in 1912 when France abolished her ancient rule that
had prohibited any "search for paternity."1 7 In this country the paternity suit
has long been known. But an antiquated law of jurisdiction continues to
create serious difficulties.
None of our jurisdictional categories can do full justice to both the child
and the alleged father. The requirement and sufficiency of jurisdiction in
personam would offer the father refuge in states far removed from the child's
abode and needs, and, on the other hand, would expose him to being "caught"
as a transient in any state.' 8 Similarly, jurisdiction in rem with its greater latitude of notice and hearing fails to secure sufficient protection to the innocent
defendant. The weight of authority now points to a regime of personal jurisdiction.19 But fortunately this question is about to lose much of its significance.
On the one hand, the plaintiff probably will soon be enabled to avail himself
of a virtually nationwide personal jurisdiction in that either the state of the
child's conception, birth or domicile will be regarded as the state creating the
"cause of action." And, on the other hand, the defendant will ultimately be
able to escape any hardship that might be imposed on him under such a
scheme of jurisdiction, by invoking the- doctrine of forum non conveniens. 20
In other respects, too, jurisdictional limitations seem to be on the wane.
Under many statutes only resident plaintiffs are entitled to sue, in keeping
with a theory of the paternity suit as one primarily designed to protect the

community against a public charge. 2 ' Increasingly, however, protection of

17 CODE CIVIL art. 340 (Fr. Dalloz 1912), was modified by a statute of Nov. 6, 1912, permitting suit in cases of rape, seduction and concubinage. BATriFOL, PRINCIPES DE DROIT
IN'rRNATIONAL Piuvt § 486 (3d ed. 1959). Italian law limits such suits to cases of rape and
abduction. See ZANNINI, LA RICERCA DLrA PATERNITA, NATURALE NEL DIRITTo INTERNA-

ZIONALE PRIVATO, STUDI PAVIA (1949). For other reasons Soviet Russia has reintroduced
the prohibition of paternity suits and has, since 1944, left the care of illegitimate children to
the state. See Valters, Das Aussereheliche Kind im Neuen Sovjetrecht, 70 J. EL. 230 (1948).
On the differing laws of the other communist countries, see Seidl-Hohenveldern, Note, 2
AM. J. Comp. L. 246, 248 n.18 (1953).
Is See EHRENZWEIG, CONFLIC4 OF LAWS § 30 (forthcoming ed. 1962); Ehrenzweig, The
Transient Rule of PersonalJurisdiction:The "Power" Myth and Forum Conveniens, 65 YALE
L.J. 289 (1956); Symposium, Leflar, Cleary, Cowen, Schlesinger, Ehrenzweig, Transient
Jurisdiction-Remnantof Pennoyerv. Neff, 9 J. PUB. L. 281-337 (1960). Where the proceedings are considered "criminal," courts may decline jurisdiction regarding children conceived outside the state. Commonwealth v. Lanoue, 326 Mass. 559, 95 N.E.2d 925 (1950)
But see State v. Tickle, 238 N.C. 206,77 S.E.2d 632 (1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 938 (1954).
19 Hartford v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 2d 447, 304 P.2d 1 (1956). See Note, 30 So. CAL.
L. REV. 336 (1957). For the conflict of authority, see EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAws § 26
n.17 (forthcoming ed. 1962).
20

EURENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 33(4) (forthcoming ed. 1962).
21 People v. Stoeckl, 347 Mich. 1, 78 N.W.2d 640 (1956); Carpenter v. Justices, 283 App.

Div. 212, 127 N.Y.S.2d 140 (1954). See generally Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 689 (1958). On other
limitations of procedural capacity, see Lasok, Legitimation,Recognition and Affiliation Pro-

ceedings, 10 INT. & Comp. L.Q. 123, 134-35 (1961).
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nonresidents has been recognized as being within the proper purview of the
paternity suit.22 Finally, we may note a lessening of that ambivalence in the
enforcement of the rights of illegitimate children, which has expressed itself
in refusals to recognize foreign decrees granting such rights. The penal or
merely regulatory character of such decrees, 23 and their lack of finality concerning the adjudication of support, 24 have been invoked to support such
refusals. But indications of a contrary trend 25 may foreshadow recognition
under full faith and credit and comity at least as to the finding of paternity.
2. Choice of Law
The object of the paternity suit has undergone a fundamental change. From
a remedy serving the punishment of the father, 26 or the recoupment from him
by the parish,27 this suit has come to be primarily concerned with the financial
protection of the child. But though no doubt a step forward, even this concern, which remains that of the laws of many countries and most states of the
Union, is anything but the final answer. Even now a support agreement may
exclude a suit for the declaration of the defendant's paternity though this
paternity is expressly denied in the agreement. 28 Several states have, therefore,
provided for paternity proceedings independent from support claims. Indeed,
the ultimate function of the suit must, beyond the child's financial protection,
be that of a means to secure his complete equality with a legitimate child.
In conflicts cases it should be assumed that any state whose legislature has
extended its solicitude for the "bastard's" interests beyond his financial security, would effectuate this policy without regard to any foreign law claimed to
be "governing" the transaction. It is most regrettable that as late as 1961 as
distinguished a court as the New York Court of Appeals has created new
22

Pelak v. Karpa, 146 Conn. 370, 151 A.2d 333 (1959); Commonwealth v. Gross, 324
Mass. 123, 85 N.E.2d 249 (1949); State v. Tetreault, 97 N.H. 260, 85 A.2d 386 (1952);
People ex rel. Robson v. Tannone, 271 App. Div. 937, 67 N.Y.S.2d 370 (1947), 271 App.

Div. 985,69 N.Y.S.2d 335 (1947); Yuin v. Hilton, 165 Ohio St. 164, 134 N.E.2d 719 (1956);
Vezina v. Bodreau, 86 R.I. 87, 133 A.2d 753 (1957). But see for a possible (and highly
undesirable) exception of foreign citizens, Feyler v. Mortimer, 299 N.Y. 309, 87 N.E.2d
273 (1949), which was distinguished on the facts in Duerr v. Wittmann, 5 App. Div.2d 326,
171 N.Y.S.2d 444, 449 (1958). See also Anon. v. Anon., 20 Misc.2d 131, 192 N.Y.S.2d 698
(Ct. Spec. Sess. 1959).
23 EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 56 n.15, § 84 (a) (forthcoming ed. 1962). See also
Note, 1 Am. J. Comp. L. 124 (1952).
24 See, e.g., Kordoski v. Belanger, 52 R.I. 268, 160 At!. 205 (1932).
25 Peterson v. Paoli, 44 So. 2d 639 (Fla. 1950); State exrel. Stone v. Helmer, 21 Iowa 370
(1866). See generally Annot., 16 A.L.R.2d 1098 (1951); Lasok, supra note 21, at 138-40.
26 See, e.g., MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 273, § 12 (1956).

27 English Poor Law Act, 18 Eliz., c. 3 (1576) (discretionary imposition of "sustentation" on "reputed Father").
28 See Haag v. Barnes, 9 N.Y.2d 554, 557-58, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65, 67, 175 N.E.2d 441,442
(1961).
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doubt regarding this vital question by giving effect, contrary to the law of the
forum and the child's domicile, to a foreign agreement aimed at foreclosing
by fixed payments not only claims for additional support but also a suit to
establish paternity. 29 We may hope, however, that this decision was primarily
determined by what the court may have considered an inequitable and possibly extortionist demand for additional support, and that this ruling will not
be construed to put the forum's policy regarding the absolute right to the
establishment of paternity at the mercy of any foreign law that appears to
permit the purchase of this right by the father.
Proof of intercourse generally creates a presumption of paternity. Rebuttal
by blood tests has found varying recognition, and is likely to be subjected to
the law of the forum as concerning a problem of procedure. In international
conflicts cases the exceptio plurium, the defense of intercourse with others,
may cause difficulty. Some countries have established a common liability of
all men proved to have had intercourse with the mother during the critical
period.30 Others exclude the defense entirely 3' on the ground that, though
"this solution encourages a promiscuous mother to sue on behalf of her child
the richest of her lovers, [it seems more important] to ensure that children
born by such mothers are not worse off than other illegitimate children." 32
Most countries permit the defense. Few conflicts cases have arisen abroad, 33
and none in this country. A "favor paternitatis," comparable to the favor
matrimonii generally recognized in the conflicts law of marriage,34 should
result in the application of the law most favorable to the child.
B. SUPPORT CLAIMS

The Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, now adopted in all
states but one, enables dependents to establish and collect support claims
against deserting providers in a multistate procedure which has removed
most jurisdictional obstacles. 35 Notwithstanding its many weaknesses, 3 6 this
Act could be most useful to illegitimate children in that it makes the district
attorney available for the interstate imposition and enforcement of support
29 Ibid.
30

On the law of Denmark, Iceland and Norway to this effect, see TOMFORDE, DIErEN-

BACH & WEBLER, DAs RECrH DES UNEHELICHEN KiNDES UND SEINER MurrEa IM IN- UND
AUSLANDE 34, 130 (1953). Soviet Russia now has joined those countries which exclude the

defense. See Seidl-Hohenveldem, supra note 17, at 248; Lasok, supra note 21, at 135-37.
31Austrian Bfirgerliches Gesetzbuch (ABGB) § 163 (1933); Law of June 14, 1917
(Sweden).
32
Seidl-Hohenveldem, supra note 17, at 248. See also Lasok, The "Exceptio Plurium
Concumbentium" in English Affiliation Proceedings, 11. L.J. 736 (1961).
33 Note, 1 AM. J. Comp. L. 124, 126-28 (1952).
34
See Ehrenzweig, Miscegenationin the Conflict of Laws, 45 CORNELL L.Q. 659 (1960).
35
EHRENZWEIG, CoNFLIcr oF LAWS §§ 82, 84 (forthcoming ed. 1962).
36 Id. at § 143 nn. 12-22.
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obligations. It seems, however, that the Act has not yet become known in
those social strata in which the illegitimate child continues to present a serious
problem. The progressing frustration of the "uniformity" of the Act by piecemeal amendment,37 may, by endangering recognition of "reciprocity," compel
fundamental reform.
Choice-of-law cases involving the support of illegitimate children seem to
be rare 38 and virtually limited to agreements by which wealthy fathers attempt to acquit themselves of their obligations with the help of laws which
continue to discriminate against the "bastard." Such laws resemble or follow
the ill-drawn and ill-fated Uniform Illegitimacy Act, long since withdrawn by
the Commissioners, which permits release agreements to "bar other remedies
of the mother or child for the support and education of the child."39 It is, of
course, highly objectionable thus to deprive a child of his chance to have his
changing needs satisfied by his father merely because, at one time, his mother
granted a permanent discharge. Even judicial approval as required by the
Uniform Act should never be given this effect. With regard to legitimate children only Georgia seems to permit the father thus to purchase his freedom
from future obligations. 40 There is no reason why such a bargain should be
permissible with regard to illegitimate children. A fortiori, where judicial
approval is lacking, other states should deny recognition to such agreements
as a matter of course, rather than consider "the failure to obtain the written
consent of a judge... a mere formality insufficient... to invalidate the
agreement." 41 And judicial approval without specific statutory authorization
should be disregarded everywhere since at least in such a case "a decree which
purports to enable [the father].., to escape [his]... duty is beyond the
power of a court to render." 42
C.

SUMMARY

Pending further humanization and unification of the domestic laws of the
several states, the following legislative and judicial measures could and
should be taken at this time in conflicts cases:
37 Id.at § 143 nn. 15-20.
38 See, e.g., Kowalski v. Wojtkowski, 19 N.J. 247, 116 A.2d 5 (1955), which denied a
mother's claim for expenses and support for an allegedly illegitimate child on the ground
that the presumption of legitimacy under the law of the children's domicile prevailed.
Where foreign laws are referred to, such reference is frequently gratuitous. See Waunakee
Canning Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n, 268 Wis.2d 518, 68 N.W.2d 25, 30 (1955), where the
court, interpreting its own statute, purported to rely on Mexican law to establish the child
as a "lineal descendant."
39 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANNOT. XXI (1957), listing seven states as having adopted the Act.
See, e.g., N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 121 (3); NEv.REv. STAT. § 126.060 (1960).
4

o See Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202, 222 n.17 (1933).
41Haag v. Barnes, 11 App. Div. 2d 430,434,207 N.Y.S.2d 624,628 (1960), affd, 9 N.Y.2d
430, 216 N.Y.S.2d 65, 175 N.E.2d 441 (1961).
42 Walder v. Walder, 159 La..231, 236, 105 So. 300, 302 (1925), quoted with approval in
State v. Woods, 223 La. 495, 501, 66 So.2d 315, 316 (1953).
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1. Courts permitted by their statutes to assume personal jurisdiction upon
constructive service if the "cause of action" has arisen within the state, should
not hesitate to assume that jurisdiction in suits for either declaration of paternity or support. States reluctant to grant such jurisdiction on a broad scale
should enact special legislation at least with regard to such suits. Otherwise
jurisdiction in rem based on the "res" of the alleged filiation could, as in divorce cases, furnish the vehicle needed to reach the absent father by constructive service at least in paternity suits.
2. Legislation permitting the mother, with or without court approval, to
waive, on the child's behalf, the right to a declaration of paternity should be
held unconstitutional as depriving the child of due process of law. On the
same ground foreign agreements to this effect should be denied recognition.
3. Legislation permitting the mother to waive the child's right to support
should be repealed or at least amended to require court approval. Foreign
decrees approving such waivers should be refused recognition where a change
of circumstances requires additional support. It must be assumed that the
Supreme Court would not adhere to its contrary ruling in the Yarborough
case.43 Thus a long step would be taken toward the final elimination from
American law of the ignominy of "bastardy."
43 Cf. Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 200, 213 (1917) (Stone J., Cardozo J., dissenting).

